The GOP Blames the Victim

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122282690823092989.html

By THOMAS FRANK

Capitalism sure is fragile if subprime borrowers can ruin it.

Two weeks ago, I wrote that the breakdown of the nation’s financial industry was undeniably a self-induced injury; that it would finally force conservatives to own up to the wrongheadedness of their deregulatory project; that they couldn’t possibly blame the disaster on any of their traditional bogeymen.

But I had forgotten about conservatives’ extraordinary instincts for blame-evasion. This is a movement, after all, that blandly recasts its greatest idols as traitors once their popularity has crashed; that routinely sloughs off responsibility for . . . well . . . anything since, by its logic, conservatism has never really been tried in the first place. Consider in this respect Mitt Romney’s remarkable speech to the Republican convention a few weeks ago, in which he rallied his party against Washington — a place his party has controlled, to one degree or another, for nearly three decades — by listing the city’s various institutions and crying, “It’s liberal!”

Or consider the way the House Republicans torpedoed the bailout bill a few days ago. The real reason they did it was almost certainly to evade responsibility for an unpopular measure but the announced reason seemed designed to convince the nation’s 7-year-olds — because Nancy Pelosi said something mean.

On economic questions the standard exculpatory maneuver is even simpler. When some free-market scheme blows up, one needs only find an institution of government in close proximity to the wreckage and commence accusing.

Thus we hear from some on the right that the disaster on Wall Street was the handiwork not of those with unbridled pecuniary motives but of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were government-sponsored enterprises and therefore partially exempt from market discipline and of theoretical necessity the sole culprits.

There is no doubt that Fannie and Freddie enabled the subprime neurosis, but for certain conservatives they are virtually the only malefactors worth noting. The dirge goes like this: Fannie and Freddie were buying up subprime mortgages, and they were doing it for (liberal) political reasons. Mortgage originators thus had no choice but to hand out mortgages like candy. Had market forces been in charge, loans would, no doubt, have been administered with a rigor and sternness to make John Calvin blanch.

I asked Bill Black, a professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City and an authority on the Savings and Loan debacle of the 1980s, what he thought of the latest blame offensive. He pointed out that, for all their failings, Fannie and Freddie didn’t originate any of the bad loans — that disastrous piece of work was done by purely private, largely unregulated companies, which did it for the usual bubble-logic reason: to make a quick buck.

Most of the mistakes for which we are paying now, Mr. Black told me, were actually made “by four entities that under conservative economic theory should have exercised effective market discipline — the appraisers, the originators of the mortgages, the rating agencies, and the investment banking firms that packaged the subprime mortgage-backed securities.” Instead of “disciplining” the markets, these private actors “served as the four horsemen of the financial apocalypse, aiding the accounting fraud and inflating the housing bubble.” It is they, Mr. Black says, who “turned a crisis into a catastrophe.”

Ah, but truth is no ally to a conservative with his back to the wall. So much more helpful are the trusty narratives on which the movement was built. So when we have dispatched this first canard, we learn from other conservatives that it is the sub-prime people who are to blame; that by taking out loans they couldn’t possibly pay off, these undesirable borrowers have ruined us all.

There is no way to measure the number of people who took out mortgages they knew they couldn’t afford, of course, but for what it’s worth, a 2007 report by the Mortgage Bankers Association reports that the FBI estimates “80 percent of all reported fraud losses arise from fraud for profit schemes that involve industry insiders.” That means the lenders, not the borrowers.

Just imagine the flights of fancy that the theory of borrower malevolence and Wall Street victimization requires conservatives to take: All these no-account folks, you see, got together and forced investment banks to engineer subprime mortgages into highly leveraged securities. Then they tricked all manner of hedge funds and pension funds and financial institutions into buying these lousy products. Just for good measure, these struggling homeowners then persuaded bond-rating agencies to misrepresent the risk associated with these securities.

Now imagine what such a fantastic scheme, if true, would mean for capitalism itself. This economic system, glorified by all, dominates the globe today, bidding prices up and down, forcing entire nations to change their ways to better suit its needs, and yet it is so fragile that when challenged by the weakest members of society and a handful of community organizers it simply crumbles. Thank goodness the Soviets never figured this out.

National Australia Bank Write-off Will Shock Wall Street

Source: Robert Gottliebsen, Business Spectator.

The National Australia Bank’s decision to write off 90 per cent of its US conduit loans will have dramatic repercussions around the world. Wall Street will be deeply shocked when they understand the repercussions of what NAB has done. It is clear global banks have nowhere near provided for their exposures to US housing loans which in the words of John Stewart are experiencing a “meltdown”.

We are now way beyond sub-prime. NAB says that it is suffering a 55 per cent loss on American housing loans – an event that has never happened in the history of a developed country in recent memory. This is an unprecedented event and means that the cost of bailing out the US financial system is now far beyond the highest estimates. A US recession is now locked in, but more alarmingly, 55 per cent loan losses point to the possibility of a depression.

It means the cost of bailing out housing exposures to the two mortgage insurers will be so great that it will leave no room to bail out anything else and there are several US banks that are now in big trouble. NAB says that the dislocation in the residential market is separate from the corporate market, but the flow on is inevitable.

While global banks have been writing down their balance sheet assets, few have tackled their conduit exposures which are off balance sheet but to which they are ultimately liable.

This morning at around 6am I wrote that we had been experiencing a ‘dead cat bounce’. I had no idea that NAB would trigger the downturn and confirm what I had written. And of course Wall Street will receive a deep shock when it wakes up.

How did NAB get caught in $1.2 billion mess? They had a number of big clients who wanted to invest in these US housing loans. They were sucked in by the ‘triple A rating’ given to the securities by the rating agencies. They did not take into account that the monoline insurers who guaranteed some of the loans had no substance. To become a player NAB took out $1.2 billion in these triple A securities and 90 per cent of it has been lost.

Many Australian institutions are very angry. NAB is paying out far too much in dividends and should be conserving capital. The American bank it purchased, Great Western, was a good idea but it is now clear it overpaid for it. Fortunately it only has a small exposure to the bad loans. But what’s happening to the NAB is not the main game.

The global banks have been marking to market the assets they held on their balance sheet, but the vast amounts held in so called ‘conduit trust accounts’ have not been written down because they were not marketable. NAB wrote them down when they saw the bad mortgages.

US banks have written down $450 billion in bad housing loans. The revelation from NAB means that they will now certainly need to take provisions to $1,000 billion. But write-downs of $1,300 billion and perhaps even more are on the cards.

Where will the equity come from to cover these bad loans? The world has never attempted a rescue effort of this size and it will make liquidity in the globe very tight. That’s why corporates will be hit. All Australian companies that need equity should raise it now.

Swan Song for Fanny Mae — Eulogy For The “Ownership Society”

Source: Mike Whitney, CounterPunch.

The Fed’s emergency rescue plan for the financial markets is hopelessly flawed. It’s a scattershot approach that doesn’t address the real source of the problem; an unregulated, unsustainable structured finance system that emerged in full-force after 2000 and spawned a shadow banking system that creates trillions of dollars of credit without sufficient capital reserves. This is the heart of the problem and it needs to be debated openly. The present system doesn’t work; it’s as simple as that. It makes no sense to provide trillions of dollars of taxpayer money to shore up a system that is essentially dysfunctional. It’s just throwing money down a rat-hole.

The Federal Reserve and US Treasury want a blank check to prop up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two war-horses of the mortgage industry, that currently underwrite nearly 80 per cent of all new mortgages in the US. But by any objective standard both of these GSEs are already insolvent. Thus, the taxpayer is being asked to rescue a failed industry that has been used for private gain so that speculators will not have to suffer the losses. Even worse, Fannie and Freddie have written hundreds of billions of dollars worth of mortgages that have not yet defaulted, but will certainly default within the next two years. This is bound to batter the already faltering economy.

The bad paper held by Fannie and Freddie are mortgages that were made to unqualified applicants who are presently losing their homes in record numbers. Their loans were approved because there was no functioning regulatory body to oversee their issuance and because the mortgages were transformed into complex securities that were sold to credulous investors around the world. The ratings were fixed to meet the requirements of their employers, the investment banks, which marketed these exotic bonds to foreign banks, insurance companies and hedge funds. That puts Fannie and Freddie at the center of a system that needs radical surgery to eradicate the bad paper. If this doesn’t happen in a timely fashion, then foreign investors will stop purchasing US debt and the dollar will crash. By creating a backstop for Fannie and Freddie, the Fed is linking US sovereign debt with mortgages and derivatives that are already known to be fraudulent. This is a big mistake. According to Merrill Lynch, the US is already facing a long-term “financing crisis” as the weakening US economy and sluggish consumer spending could signal an end to the $700 billion in foreign investment that covers America’s current account deficit. By assuming the GSE’s enormous debts, the Bush administration is just speeding this process along and inviting disaster.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has been intentionally oblique about the implications of the proposed bailout. On Tuesday, he delivered a statement in front of the massive stone columns of the Department of the Treasury, a towering monolith that arouses feelings of confidence in rock-solid institutions. He made it clear that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would have the “explicit” backing of the US government:

“First, as a liquidity backstop, the plan includes a temporary increase in the line of credit the GSEs have with Treasury. Treasury would determine the terms and conditions for accessing the line of credit and the amount to be drawn.

Second, to ensure the GSEs have access to sufficient capital to continue to serve their mission, the plan includes temporary authority for Treasury to purchase equity in either of the two GSEs if needed.

Third, to protect the financial system from systemic risk going forward, the plan strengthens the GSE regulatory reform legislation currently moving through Congress by giving the Federal Reserve a consultative role in the new GSE regulator’s process for setting capital requirements and other prudential standards.”

It was an impressive performance from a public relations point of view, but it didn’t fool anyone on Wall Street. What Wall Street wants is details not blather. Paulson gave no specifics about how much money the government would provide or what the nature of the new relationship would be; conservatorship, recievorship, nationalization? What is it?

The truth is that Paulson was deliberately vague because he and friend Bernanke would like to have it both ways; they’d like to provide a liquidity backstop and an endless line of credit for the two GSE’s without formally nationalizing them. That would avoid the further dilution of stock values while keeping the US government from taking another $5 trillion of mortgage debt onto their balance sheet. It is a delicate balancing act, but Paulson seems to think he carried it off. He’s wrong, though, and volatility in the stock market proves it. Investors are clearly skittish about the new arrangement. They want to know the facts about the government’s commitment. Paulson is discovering that deceiving investors is not as easy as duping the public about fictional WMD or Niger uranium. Sometimes even the dullest person can grasp the most complex matters when it comes to his own money.

Fannie and Freddie have been insolvent for ages, but it hasn’t stopped lawmakers from pushing the envelope and loading more debt on their balance sheets. Here’s how Barron’s summed it up more than six months ago:

“Fannie’s balance sheet is larded with soft assets and understated liabilities that would leave the company ill-equipped to weather a serious financial crisis. And spiraling mortgage defaults and falling home prices could bring a tsunami of credit losses over the next two years that will severely test Fannie’s solvency.

But, if the truth be known, a considerable portion of Fannie’s losses also came from speculative forays into higher-yielding but riskier mortgage products like subprime, Alt-A (a category between subprime and prime in credit quality) and dicey mortgages requiring monthly payments of interest only or less. For example, Fannie’s $314 billion of Alt-A — often called liar loans because borrowers provide little documentation — accounted for 31.4% of the company’s credit losses while making up just 11.9% of its $2.5 trillion single-family-home credit book. Fannie was clearly looking for love — and market share — in some of the wrong places.”

Rampant speculation, risky investments, and Enron-type accounting; hardly the stuff of solid portfolios. That’s why the two mortgage giants are stumbling headlong towards oblivion despite the Treasury’s panicky relief operation. By last Friday Fannie’s stock had fallen 47 per cent while Freddie was down 50 per cent. The public may still be in the dark about what is going on, but investors have a pretty good grip on the situation; they can see the great birds are already circling overhead and its just a matter of time before they descend on their prey. Paulson’s attempts to muddy the water have amounted to nothing. The fact remains that the two biggest mortgage-lenders in the world are busted and last week’s stock sell-off was tantamount to a run on the country’s largest bank. Paulson’s statement was really nothing more than a eulogy for the mortgage industry; a few heartfelt words over the rigid corpse of a close friend.

When the housing market started to tumble and Wall Street’s “securitization” model froze-up, Fannie had to take the lion’s share of the mortgages to keep the real estate market hobbling along. In a two year period, between the housing peak in 2005 and 2007, Fannie went from roughly 40 per cent of the market to about 80 per cent. The Congress even enlarged the size of the mortgages they could underwrite from $417,000 to over $700,000. The prospect of bankruptcy never diminished congress’s generosity.

Fannie and Freddie currently own or underwrite roughly half of the nation’s $12 trillion mortgage market. Basically, every home mortgage lender depends on them for financing. Their shares are owned by individual investors and banks around the world. Foreign investors have always believed that the GSE bonds were as risk-free as US government Treasuries. Now they are beginning to wonder. (Foreign central banks, led by China and Russia, hold at least $925 billion in U.S. agency debt, including bonds sold by Freddie and Fannie, according to official U.S. statistics)

Whatever happens to Fannie, the loss of investor confidence will send long term interest higher as investors demand bigger returns for the risk they’re taking on GSE bonds. That’ll put a straitjacket on home sales which are already flagging from soaring inventory and falling prices. Higher rates could bring the whole housing market to a standstill.

The Fed’s cheap credit policy under Greenspan created an artificial demand for housing which ballooned into the biggest equity bubble in history. Low interest rates are a subsidy which naturally lead to speculation and asset-inflation. At a certain point, however, the endless debt-pyramiding reaches its apex and the whole mechanism switches into reverse. Now the economy has entered deleveraging-hell where everything is primal blackness and the gnashing of teeth, the flip-side of speculative rapture.

By some estimates, Freddie Mac has a negative net-worth of $17 billion. It’s basically insolvent, although Paulson would like to see the charade go on a while longer. Investors purchased another $3 billion of the two GSEs last Monday, but the appetite for failing bonds is diminishing. What’s certain is that the collapse of Fannie and Freddie would be a watershed event and a mortal blow to the US financial system. $5 trillion in shaky mortgage-debt can’t be easily swept under the rug and ignored. Interest rates on everything would quickly rise; credit would become scarcer, economic growth would shrivel, unemployment would soar, and the dollar will plummet. As the two mortgage giants continue to get whipsawed by higher priced capital and waning investment, US government debt will likely to lose its much-vaunted triple A credit rating. On Friday, credit default swaps on government debt doubled, a sign that investors are losing confidence that the US will be able to manage its twin deficits or pay off its debts. It’s the end of the road for Washington’s free lunch throng and for a paper dollar that isn’t backed by much of anything except music videos, fast food and smart-bombs.

Paulson’s Power Grab

What Paulson is really wants is for congress to allow the Fed to regulate the financial system without congressional oversight. Paulson’s so-called blueprint for financial regulation is a blatant power-grab meant to expand the authority of the banking oligarchy giving them unlimited power over the markets. Journalist Barry Grey sums it up like this in his article on “US Bailout of Mortgage Giants: The politics of plutocracy”:

“The plan outlined by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson would give him virtually unlimited and unilateral authority to pump tens of billions of dollars of public funds into the mortgage finance companies. At the same time, the Federal Reserve Board announced that it would allow the companies to directly borrow Fed funds… The Democrats…now march in lockstep with the minority party to rush through laws demanded by Wall Street… The buying of legislators and their votes by corporate interests is carried out openly and shamelessly. Members of Frank’s House Financial Services Committee received over $18 million from financial services, insurance and real estate firms this year. Frank himself raised over $1.2 million, almost half of which came from finance and related industries…Senator Dodd’s top contributor in the 2003-2008 election cycle was Citigroup, followed by SAC Capital Partners. He raised $4.25 million from securities and investment firms.
Senator Schumer’s top contributor was likewise Citigroup. He raised $1.4 million from securities and investment firms, his most lucrative corporate sector.”

The smell of political corruption is overpowering, and yet, the plan is moving forward regardless. Even if Paulson’s plan worked in the short term, the damage would be enormous. It would place the country’s regulatory powers and purse-strings in the hands of the same amoral banksters who created this mess to begin with. It is the fast-track to corporate feudalism on a nationwide scale.

Pitfalls for the GSEs

The biggest problem facing Fannie and Freddie is that wary investors will not roll over the debt of the two companies which will precipitate a collapse. This is where it pays to have people who can be trusted in positions of power. Henry Paulson is the worst thing that ever happened to the US Treasury. Paulson is to finance capitalism what Rumsfeld is to military strategy. To say that Paulson is lacking in credibility is an understatement. Nothing he says can be taken at face-value. When Paulson says “the worst is behind us” or the “subprime crisis is contained” or the Bush administration “supports a strong dollar policy”; most people know it is a fabrication. Besides, Paulson is completely out of his depth in the present crisis. His appearances on TV, with the beads of sweat glistening on his forehead, and his foolish repetition of the same stale mantra is eroding confidence in the financial system and sending waves of panic rippling through Wall Street. Enough is enough. He needs to go.

If the administration was serious about changing direction they would dump Paulson and reinstate Paul Volcker. Whatever one thinks about Volcker, his presence would calm the markets and send a message that the adults were back in charge. But that won’t happen. The Bush team still thinks they can finesse their way through the thicket of investor skepticism. That means that catastrophe is inevitable as more and more investors pick up their bets and head for the exits.

Time Is Running Out

Whatever the administration decides to do; time is short and they have one chance to get it right. The Treasury needs to find a way to ring-fence the garbage bonds and pray that the investing public won’t dump their holdings in a panic run on the market. Either way, it’s a gamble and there’s no guarantee of success. The Wall Street Journal outlined the doomsday scenario if Paulson’s plan fails:

“Falling house prices and nonpaying homeowners cause the value of the trillions of dollars in outstanding debt held by these government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie and Freddie) to plunge. Many banks have balance sheets stuffed full of this paper. They face huge losses, which some can’t survive. They and other investors, such as foreign central banks, then dump the GSE paper.

Fannie and Freddie would end up unable to lend, or at least to take up anything like their current 80% share of the U.S. mortgage market, further punishing the reeling housing market. This would add another twist to the spiral of falling prices, credit losses and failing lenders.

What should they do? First, devise a plan — and fast. There is no time to dither.” (Wall Street Journal)

If foreign banks and investors ditch their GSE debt, it will send shockwaves through the global economy. But if the Treasury provides unlimited funding for a sinking operation, it’s likely to trigger a sell-off of the dollar. It’s a lose-lose situation. For now, bond holders are sitting-tight even though the stock is tanking, but for how long? They’ve already been taken to the cleaners on hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage-backed garbage; now there are rumors that the US government won’t back agency debt. What kind of shabby shell-game is the US playing anyway?

New York Times:

“If people lose faith in Fannie and Freddie, then the whole system freezes up, and nobody can buy a house, and the entire housing market can crash,” said Paul Miller of the Friedman, Billings, Ramsey Group in Arlington, Va. “There’s a fine line between having faith and losing it, and sometimes it’s unclear when it has disappeared. But when investors cross that line, bad things happen very quickly.”

And it affects more than the housing market, too. The bond and equities markets are handcuffed to real estate and they’re already listing from the slowdown in investment. The Fed thought they could keep the whole mess from going sideways by opening up “auction facilities” where the banks could get low interest capital in exchange for their mortgage-backed junk. But the banks have curtailed their lending and there’s bigger trouble ahead. Bridgewater Associates issued a warning last week that losses to the banking system would exceed $1.6 trillion, four times original estimates and enough to crash the entire banking system. So far, banks have only written down $450 billion, which means that they are only 25 per cent of the way through the current credit storm. Defaults are liable to skyrocket as hundreds of undercapitalized banks turn to a grossly underfunded FDIC ($52 billion in reserves) to cover the losses of their depositors. The prospect of a humongous taxpayer bailout seems nearly unavoidable.

What’s most disturbing is that nothing has been done to restore the markets to a functional model. The Fed’s strategy is still to try to keep the relatively new “structured finance” model (with all it’s bizarre-named debt instruments and derivatives) in place even though it failed its first stress-test and has demonstrated that it cannot withstand even moderate downward movement in the market. The current model is kaput; there needs to be a Plan B or the Fed is just wasting its time.

Fannie’s demise comes at a particularly difficult time for the banking system. According to a report by Paul Kasriel, Chief Economist at Northern Trust:

“The sharpest 13-week contraction in bank credit” since data were first available in 1973. Banks simply don’t have the capital on hand to avail “themselves of the cheap credit the Fed is offering to fund them at.”….This is what it means to be in a “credit crunch.” Banks have suffered hundreds of billions in losses, forcing them to pull credit out of the economy. Every time you read an article about banks cutting credit lines, exiting lending businesses, or eliminating mortgage products it represents more bank credit drying up.” (Option Armageddon, “Understanding Bernanke”)

Bank credit is drying up because the capital is being destroyed (from foreclosures and downgraded assets) faster than anytime in history. We are just now feeling the first stiff breezes from a Force-5 deflationary hurricane set to touch down in 2009. Fannie and Freddie are teetering towards insolvency while the country is entering the most vicious downward cycle since the Great Depression. Higher interest rates, negative home equity, mounting credit card debt, auto loan debt, commercial real estate debt and tightening lending standards will only curtail consumer spending more putting greater pressure on the dollar.

The Fed will have to be selective; not everything can be saved. Significant parts of the financial system will be reduced to ashes. It would be wiser to clear the brush away from as many of the solvent institutions as possible and prepare for the worst. Otherwise, the whole system is at risk of contagion. Hundreds of local and regional banks are expected to go under. (the average small bank has 67% of its assets in real estate) It can’t be avoided. They are holding too much bad paper and no way to make up for the losses. They’re following the same path as the 250 mortgage lenders that vaporised in the subprime meltdown. They couldn’t be saved either.

The bigger investment banks are in trouble too. That’s why the SEC has finally decided to act as a regulator and go after short-sellers:

“The Securities and Exchange Commission announced an emergency action aimed at reducing short-selling aimed at Wall Street brokerage firms, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and will immediately begin considering new rules to extend new requirements to the rest of the market.”

The SEC never took an interest in naked shorting of stocks (or commodities speculators) while its fat-cat friends in the big brokerage houses were raking in billions. Now that many of these same institutions, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are in the crosshairs, SEC chief Christopher Cox is rushing to their rescue. It is utter duplicity, but it illustrates an important point; the system is cannibalizing itself just like Karl Marx predicted over 100 years ago. Unchecked greed is inevitably self-destructive.

A growing number of market analysts are beginning to notice the storm clouds forming on the horizon. The Royal Bank of Scotland has advised clients to brace for a full-fledged crash in global stock and credit markets over the next three months. The Bank of international Settlements (BIS) made a similarly ominous warning that the credit crisis could lead world economies into a crash on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The bank suggests that government officials and market analysts have not fully grasped the financial turmoil that could result from the mortgage crisis and its effects of the global economic system. The body points out that the Great Depression was not anticipated because people ignored the implicit danger of “complex credit instruments, a strong appetite for risk, rising levels of household debt and long-term imbalances in the world currency system.”

Ron Paul (R-Texas) is one of the few members of congress who has shown that he has a grasp of the impending economic disaster now facing the country if corrective action is not taken swiftly. In a speech he gave last week on the floor of the House, he said:

“There are reasons to believe this coming crisis is different and bigger than the world has ever experienced…The financial crisis, still in its early stages, is apparent to everyone: gasoline prices over $4 a gallon; skyrocketing education and medical-care costs; the collapse of the housing bubble; the bursting of the NASDAQ bubble; stock markets plunging; unemployment rising;, massive underemployment; excessive government debt; and unmanageable personal debt. Little doubt exists as to whether we’ll get stagflation. The question that will soon be asked is: When will the stagflation become an inflationary depression? “

The troubles at Fannie and Freddie are symptomatic of more deeply rooted problems related to abusive lending and the unsustainable expansion of credit. We’ve now reached our debt limit and the bills must be repaid or written off. The Bush administration is hoping to reflate the bubble by (stealthily) recapitalizing the GSEs, but it won’t be easy. As one blogger put it, we have reached “peak credit” and have nowhere to go except down.

Economist Michael Hudson summed it up like this:

“The reality is that Fannie, Freddie and the FHA gave a patina of confidence to irresponsible lending and outright fraud. This confidence game led them to guarantee some $5.3 trillion of mortgages, and to keep $1.6 trillion more on their own books to back the bonds they issued to institutional investors.”

It was a scam of Biblical proportions and now it is all starting to unravel. Bush’s “ownership society” was a cheap parlor trick engineered by the Fed’s low interest rates to trigger massive speculation and shift wealth from one class to another. Now, the housing bubble has crashed and the excruciating reality of insolvency is beginning to sink in.

Michael Hudson, again:

“All one hears is a barrage of claims that the government must preserve the financial fictions of Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac in order to ‘save the market.’ The usual hypocrisy is being brought to bear claiming that all this is necessary to ‘save the middle class,’ even as what is being saved are its debts, not its assets…The “way of life” that is being saved is not that of home ownership, but debt peonage to support the concentration of wealth at the top of the economic pyramid.

Mortgages are the major debts of most American families. In this role, real estate debt has become the basis for the commercial banking system, and hence the basis for the wealthiest 10 percent of the population who hold the bottom 90 percent in debt. That is what Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and “the market” are all about.” (Michael Hudson; “Why the Bail Out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is Bad Economic Policy”, counterpunch.org)

The housing boom never had anything to do with Bush’s Utopian-sounding “ownership society”. It was always just a swindle to enrich the banking establishment and divert middle class wealth to ruling class elites.

Gramm calls America “Nation Of Whiners,” economic slowdown “mental” because he’s mental

This from the man behind the curtain of the current subprime mortgage mess. Of course, when you’re one of the Elites, the suffering of useless eaters sounds like a bunch of whining.

This has got to be one of the most depressing presidential elections: we’ve got two losers to chose from to lead the nation further down the toilet.

Update: Comments from WhatReallyHappened:

Memo to Phil Graham: just in case you haven’t noticed it, the US dollar has lost 41% of its value under this administration’s watch.

Financial institutions have written off millions of dollars.

Fannie Mae is near financial collapse.

Bank seizures have tripled.

Gas is heading toward 5 dollars per gallon with no end in sight.

Pension funds and 401Ks have lost value.

Major corporations (because tax laws are written in such a way that they can) have outsourced most of their manufacturing offshore.

People without jobs have no health insurance, and many times cannot get the health services they need because they don’t have the money to pay for them.

All these elements, sir, are not psychological: they are purely economic..

Of course, you wouldn’t know, would you?

You and the rest of congress have voted yourselves the best retirement package and health care package that the taxpayer’s dollar would buy for you.

And opening your mouth and making this statement in public is the US politician’s 21st century equivalent to to Marie Antoinette’s statement, about the starving French who could not buy bread, when she was reputed to have said “Let them eat cake!”

(Ahem)

You do remember the subsequent response of the French people to the excesses of their government, Senator, do you not?

Source: MIKE ALLEN, Politico.

Former Sen. Phil Gramm, a top economic adviser to presumptive GOP nominee John McCain, referred to the economic slowdown as “a mental recession” and called the United States “a nation of whiners.”

The comments, in an interview with The Washington Times, could hurt the campaign’s efforts to convince working-class Americans that McCain feels their pain.

McCain strongly disavowed the comments today , saying Phil Gramm “does not speak for me — I speak for me.”

“So I strongly disagree,” McCain told reporters gathered for a press conference.

Democrats immediately condemned the remarks as “callous” and quickly began working to divert widespread attention to them.

Obama campaign spokesman Bill Burton shot back: “[T]he American people know that our economic problems aren’t just in their heads. They don’t need psychological relief, they need real relief. And that’s what Barack Obama will provide as president.”

The Democratic National Committee issued a statement titled, “Out of Touch Much, Phil.”

A McCain official said: “Phil Gramm’s comments are not representative of John McCain’s views. John McCain travels the country every day talking to Americans who are hurting, feeling pain at the pump and worrying about how they’ll pay their mortgage. That’s why he has a realistic plan to deliver immediate relief at the gas pump, grow our economy and put Americans back to work.”

The Times said Gramm said he expects a McCain administration would inherit an economy “weighed down above all by the conviction of many Americans that economic conditions are the worst in two or three decades and that America is in decline.”

The Times quoted him as saying: “You’ve heard of mental depression; this is a mental recession. … We have sort of become a nation of whiners.”

“You just hear this constant whining, complaining, about a loss of competitiveness, America in decline. … We’ve never been more dominant; we’ve never had more natural advantages than we have today.”

Karen Finney, the Democratic National Committee’s communications director, said: “What John McCain, George Bush, Phil Gramm just don’t understand is that the American people aren’t whining about the state of the economy; they are suffering under the weight of it — the weight of eight years of Bush-enomics that John McCain and Phil Gramm have vowed to continue.

“How dare john McCain and his advisers so callously dismiss the challenges the American people face? No wonder voters feel John McCain is out of touch. He and his campaign don’t even understand the everyday issues Americans are dealing with.”

Is the GOP cooking the books to avoid recession till after Election Day?

Source: James K. Galbraith, Mother Jones.

©Unknown

Is the worst over? Are we on the road to recovery? Will the next president take office against a backdrop of economic improvement, as Bill Clinton did in 1993? Or has something deeper and more intractable gone wrong?

Early this year, the optimists, including Citigroup chairman Bob Rubin and Treasury secretary Hank Paulson, argued that the slowdown was short-term and that a “stimulus” package should be “targeted and temporary.” This with rare haste the Democratic Congress enacted. As a result, most taxpayers got one-time $600 checks in May, prefigured by bubbly messages touting “Good News!” if you filed your taxes electronically.

The rebate isn’t the only little Dutch boy thrown headlong at the dike this election year. Government spending, especially for defense, will be up: Military spending as a share of gdp is expected to grow by $75 billion in fiscal 2008, enough to neutralize a 0.3 percent decline in gdp. Dick Cheney was secretary of defense for Bush 41; just before the 1992 election he engineered a big run-up in outlays, as the military restocked following the first Gulf War. (It was exposed in the first Clinton “Economic Report.”) Is the Pentagon up to that trick again? I’d be astonished if it were not.

©Galbraith et al

How Fed’s election-year rates varied from nonelection years.

Under intense pressure from panicky bankers, Ben Bernanke cut interest rates relentlessly from August 2007 through the spring of 2008. I don’t accuse Bernanke of playing politics. But it’s worth noting that this is what usually happens. In presidential election years when Republicans are in office, the Fed regularly and predictably pursues a more expansionary policy than when Democrats rule – after controlling for differences in the rates of inflation and unemployment. (I made these calculations myself; see the chart.) Maybe they just can’t help themselves.

But much of the ordinary effect of interest cuts on new lending – like a rebound in construction and automobile sales – didn’t happen this time. That’s because the fall in home prices (and therefore the value of collateral) overwhelmed the benefit of cheaper money to the banks. And the banks barely cut mortgage rates, so consumers saw no benefits at all. Lower interest rates did cut the value of the dollar, however, and that promotes exports and foreign investment. (These days New York Times real estate listings come with a currency converter.) It also boosts the stock market, since multinational firms can report their (unchanged) foreign income as higher dollar earnings.

Possibly all this stimulus will ward off the two-quarter decline that has historically defined a recession. Don’t be surprised: Republicans haven’t had an election-year slump since 1960. On the other hand, the National Bureau of Economic Research, which has the official call, may describe the early spring as a recession anyway. Republicans will welcome that, too, so long as they can plausibly call the summer a “recovery.” Even if they can’t stop a recession, they may be able to make it short and shallow enough, this year, to put John McCain in the White House. But all this brings up an important question – what of next year?

No matter how effective the stimulus, two enormous clouds remain for whoever becomes president: the housing slump and the banking crisis. Both are far from being finished yet.

The problem with a housing slump is inventory. Unlike factories and Internet startups, shuttered houses don’t go away. No one declares them obsolete. They aren’t boxed up and sent to China. They remain, a drag on the market, decaying and pulling down property values for years. Here in Texas, housing values slumped with the S&L crisis and the oil bust of 1985 and did not recover until around 1993. That slump clobbered the oil patch but was barely felt anywhere else. This slump is the reverse – it’s driving down housing prices just about everywhere except Texas, where the scars of the last bubble helped keep the recent one under control.

Nationally, the subprime debacle is blowing away the homeownership gains of the last few years. Those abusive mortgages were deliberately targeted at vulnerable, even desperate, people who could be steered into financial death traps. Lenders didn’t care, because with the help of fraudulent appraisals, the loans could be off-loaded quickly in packages bought by greedy or gullible investors, including your pension fund. Poor people got hit on the front end; 1.5 million homes entered foreclosure last year. Middle-class people got it on the return volley.

And middle-class homeowners are now getting hit a second way: in the declining value of their homes. You don’t have to be holding a subprime to find yourself underwater. That means that home-equity loans will dry up. (As of April, California homeowners in default were already a median of eight months behind on those loans.) Many people will be tempted to walk on their houses and mail the keys to the bank. Incidents of the foreclosed expressing themselves to their lenders by yanking the plumbing and the wires on the way out the door are on the rise, as is arson by desperate homeowners, according to the Los Angeles Times. Will students, small businesses, and other borrowers still be able to get credit when this is over? God only knows.

The mechanisms of mortgage finance and home-equity drawdown haven’t simply been damaged. That well has been poisoned. Having largely outsourced mortgage originations to companies like Countrywide who didn’t care whether the borrowers had good credit, the banking system cannot easily go back to its old method of making loans to creditworthy people and contenting itself with the interest paid back over many years. And who would trust them, anyway, if that’s what they claimed they wanted to do?

Then there’s another problem: The banks no longer trust each other. Last August, as mortgage-backed securities unraveled, finances froze up worldwide. Why? Because banks knew how much undisclosed junk they had on their own books. Who could say what the next fellow had? Overnight lending between banks – the process that ensures that every bank has funds when it needs them – fell apart. This is a very big deal. If banks will not lend money to each other, why (except for the blessings of federal insurance) should anyone else leave their money to them? Economists like me wait entire careers to study events such as these – which should provide no comfort to anyone else.

Since August, America’s big banks have been wards of the Fed, and those in Europe equally so of the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. The system survives because central banks keep the lending windows open, and the result is that – except for one instance in Britain – the public has not pulled out of the banks. Let’s be clear. The private financial markets did actually fail. It’s only the fact that the public trusts government that keeps the system from dissolving in panic. But even if the Fed and its counterparts can hold the line, the problem of mistrust among the big bankers won’t go away soon. And that means we’re at the end of the age of credit expansions, for now.

As for next year, good luck. No matter who becomes president, there probably won’t be another tax cut. Instead, cries for “fiscal responsibility” will be heard. States and localities, hit in 2008 on their property taxes, will cut their spending. Consumers, hit hard on their home equity, will cut back on new borrowing (which they probably couldn’t get anyway) and pinch pennies however they can. Businesses won’t even think about new investments.

In this situation, more cuts to interest rates – the only applicable tool the Fed has – don’t work well. And they weaken the dollar, which raises inflation. What is gained by cheaper money will be lost in higher gas and food prices. But if the Fed reverses field and defends the dollar, exports will slump and the housing crisis will get worse. There’s no easy way out.

Thus far the dollar has fallen, but it hasn’t collapsed. Will it? There are two big threats. The first is the financial crisis itself, which is a problem of trust not only in the ordinary borrower, and not only in the banks, but in the American dollar. Why is the rest of the world nervous? Because the fundamental trust that they have always had – that the United States was a safe place to put your money – has come into question.

The second threat, not often mentioned, is our reckless foreign policy, including the invasion of Iraq, bellicosity toward Iran, and the ongoing subtext of hostility toward China. Since the Middle East has the oil and China holds our debts, all this is spitting in the soup, big time. It may not by itself wreck the financial system. But it doesn’t exactly build up the reserve of good will that we may need when the financial going gets tough.

For half a century much of the world believed that we provided security under which they too could prosper; many no longer think so. Today, our country, like our banks, has a problem of global trust. Unlike the banks, we have no higher power to keep things going if we screw up.

The Subprime Trump Card: Standing up to the Banks

Source: Dr. Ellen Brown, Global Research. See her website, Web of Debt, for excerpts from her book.

“If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of all property until their children wake up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered. The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, to whom it properly belongs.”

– Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin (1802)

Jefferson had it right. More than 1.5 million homeowners are expected to enter foreclosure this year, and about half of them are expected to have their homes repossessed. If the dire consequences Jefferson warned of 200 years ago have been slow in coming, it is because they have been concealed by what Jerome a Paris calls the Anglo Disease – “the highly unequal economy whereby the rich and the financial sector . . . capture most of the income but hide it by providing cheap debt to the middle classes so that they can continue to spend.” He calls “finance” the “cannibalistic” sector in today’s economy. Writing in The European Tribune this month, he states:

“[O]ne of the more attractive features of the financial world, for its promoters, is its ability to concentrate huge fortunes in a small number of hands, and promote this as a good thing (these people are said to be creating wealth, rather than capturing it). . . . [O]f course, the reality is that such wealth concentration is created by squeezing the rest, as is obvious in the stagnation of incomes for most in the middle and lower rungs of society. This is not so much wealth creation as wealth redistribution, from the many to the few. But what has made this unequality . . . tolerable is that the financial world itself was able to provide a convenient smokescreen, in the form of cheap debt, provided in abundance to all. The wealthy used it to grab real assets in funny money, and the rest were kindly allowed to keep on spending by tapping their future income rather than their insufficient current one; in a nutshell, the debt bubble hid the class warfare waged by the rich against everybody else . . . .”¹

Now the debt bubble is bursting, with the anticipated real estate crash, banking crisis, foreclosures, and inevitable recession. “The income capture mechanisms set up during the bubble have not been reversed, so the pain is falling disproportionately on the poorest,” writes Jerome a Paris. Meanwhile, finance is being bailed out. What’s to be done? “[T]he financiers . . . will say that more ‘reform’ and ‘deregulation’ and tax cuts are needed,” he says, but “maybe it’s time to stop listening to what is highly self-interested drivel, and take back what they grabbed: it’s not theirs.”

Good idea, but how? The financiers own the media, and their massively funded lobbies control Congress. How can we the people get enough clout to take on the giant financial and corporate giants? What can we do that will make politicians sit up and take notice?

How about swarming the courts? New case law indicates that a majority of the 750,000 homeowners expected to lose their homes this year could have a valid defense to foreclosure. As much as $2 trillion in real estate may be vulnerable to this defense, providing a very big stick for a lobby of motivated debtors. Mobilizing that group, in turn, could light a fire under the investors in mortgage-backed securities — the pension funds, money market funds and insurance companies holding these “orphan” mortgages. These investors also wield a very big stick, in the form of major law firms on retainer. When the embattled banks demand a bailout because they are “too big to fail,” the taxpayers can respond, “You have already failed. It is time to try something new.”

The Legal Trump Card: Make Them Produce the Note

A basic principle of contract law is that a plaintiff suing on a written contract must produce the signed contract proving he is entitled to relief. If there is no signed mortgage note or recorded assignment, foreclosure is barred. The defendant must normally raise this defense, and most defaulting homeowners, unaware of legal procedure and concerned about the expense of hiring an attorney, just let their homes go uncontested. But when the plaintiffs bringing subprime foreclosure actions have been challenged, in most cases they haven’t been able to produce the notes.

Why not? It appears to be more than just sloppy paperwork. The banks that originally entered into these risky subprime arrangements generally did so because they had no intention of holding the loans on their books. The mortgages were immediately sliced and diced, bundled up as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and sold off to investors. Loan originators sold the mortgages to financial institutions or other banks, which then sold the rights to the monthly mortgage payment income to investors, while transferring the responsibility to collect these payments to specialized mortgage servicing companies. The result has been to slice up the mortgage contract, with no party really having ownership of the original paperwork. When foreclosure has been initiated, the servicer or trustee acting as plaintiff now has trouble proving that it originated the mortgage or owned the loan. In order for a second bank or financial institution to have standing to bring a foreclosure lawsuit in court, it must have been assigned the mortgage; and with the collapse of the housing market, many of the subprime lenders have gone out of business, making it impossible to contact the originating mortgage company. Other paperwork has just been lost in the shuffle.²

Why weren’t the mortgage notes assigned to the MBS holders when they were first sold? Apparently because the investors aren’t even matched up with specific properties until after default. Here is how the MBS scheme works: when the mortgages are first bundled by the banks, all of the subprime mortgages go into the same pool. The bundled mortgages are chopped into “securities” that are sold to many investors — banks, hedge funds, money market funds, pension funds — with different “tranches” or levels of risk. The first mortgages to default are then assigned to the high-risk “BBB-” tranche of investors. As defaults increase, later defaulting mortgages are assigned down the chain of risk to the supposedly more secure tranches.³ That means the investors get the mortgages only after the defendants breached the agreement to pay.

It also means the investors weren’t a party to the agreement when it was breached, making it hard to prove they were injured by the breach.

The investors have another problem: the delay in assigning particular mortgages to particular investors means there was no “true sale” of the security (the home) at the time of securitization. A true sale of the collateral is a legal requirement for forming a valid security (a secured interest in the property as opposed to simply a debt obligation backed by collateral). As a result, the investors may have trouble proving they have any interest in the property, secured or unsecured.⁴

The Dog-Ate-My-Note Defense

When the securitizing banks acting as trustees for the investors are unable to present written proof of ownership at a time that would entitle them to foreclose, they typically file what’s called a lost-note affidavit. April Charney is a Florida legal aid attorney well versed in these issues, having gotten foreclosure proceedings dismissed or postponed for 300 clients in the past year. In a February 2008 Bloomberg article, she was quoted as saying that about 80 percent of these cases involved lost-note affidavits. “Lost-note affidavits are pattern and practice in the industry,” she said. “They are not exceptions. They are the rule.“³

In the past, judges have let these foreclosures proceed; but in October 2007, an intrepid federal judge in Cleveland put a halt to the practice. U.S. District Court Judge Christopher Boyko ruled that Deutsche Bank had not filed the proper paperwork to establish its right to foreclose on fourteen homes it was suing to repossess.⁴ That started the ball rolling, and by February 2008, judges in at least five states had followed suit. In Los Angeles in January, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Samuel L. Bufford issued a notice warning plaintiffs in foreclosure cases to bring the mortgage notes to court and not submit copies. In Ohio, where foreclosures were up by a reported 88 percent in 2007, Attorney General Marc Dann was reported to be challenging ownership of mortgage notes in forty foreclosure cases.⁵

Few defendants, however, are lucky enough to have advocates like Charney and Dann in their corner, and most defaulting debtors just let their homes go. A simple challenge can be filed to the complaint even without an attorney, and some subprime borrowers have successfully defended their own foreclosure actions; but retaining an attorney is strongly recommended. People representing themselves are often not taken seriously, and they are likely to miss local rule requirements. With that warning, here is some general information on challenging standing to foreclose:

Some states are judicial foreclosure states and some are non-judicial foreclosure states. In a judicial foreclosure state (meaning the matter is heard before a judge), if a promissory note or recorded assignment naming the plaintiff is not attached to the complaint, the defendant can file a response stating the plaintiff has failed to state a claim. This can be followed with a motion called a demurrer to the complaint. Different forms of demurrers can be found in legal form books in most law libraries. In essence the demurrer states that even if everything in the complaint were true, the complaint would lack substance because it fails to set out a copy of the note, and it should therefore be dismissed. Ordinarily there is no need to cite much in the way of statutes or case law other than the authority reciting the necessity of showing the note proving the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

In a non-judicial foreclosure state such as California, foreclosure is done by a trustee without a court hearing, so the procedure is a bit trickier; but standing to foreclose can still be challenged. If the homeowner has filed for bankruptcy, the proceedings are automatically stayed, requiring the lender to bring a motion for relief from stay before going forward. The debtor can then challenge the lender’s right to the security (the house) by demanding proof of a legal or equitable interest in it.⁶ A homeowner facing foreclosure can also get the matter before a court without filing for bankruptcy by filing a complaint and preliminary injunction staying the proceedings pending proof of standing to foreclose. A judge would then have to rule on the merits. A complaint for declaratory relief might also be brought against the trustee, seeking to have its rights declared invalid.⁷

An Equitable Settlement for Everyone

These defenses can help people who are about to lose their homes, but there is another class of victims in the sub-prime mortgage crisis: investors in MBS, including the pension funds and 401Ks on which many people depend for their retirement. If the trustees representing the investors cannot foreclose, the lucky debtors may be able to stay in their homes without paying. However, the hapless investors will be left holding the bag. If the investors manage to shift liability back to the banks, on the other hand, the banks could go down and take the economy with them. How can these tricky issues be resolved in a way that is equitable for all? That question will be addressed in a followup article. Stay tuned.

NOTES

1. Jerome a Paris, “Countdown to $200 Oil Meets Anglo Disease,” European Tribune (June 7, 2008).

2 “Contesting a Foreclosure Lawsuit: Who Owns the Mortgage?”, ForeclosureFish.com (April 22, 2008).

3. CNBC, “Subprime Derivatives,” youtube.com/watch?v=0YNyn1XGyWg (June 2007).

4 Vinod Kothari, “The True Sale Question,” vindkothari.com.

3. Bob Ivry, “Banks Lose to Deadbeat Homeowners as Loans Sold in Bonds Vanish,” Bloomberg.com (February 22, 2008).

4. Judge Christopher A. Boyko, Opinion and Order, In re Foreclosure Cases, Case 1:07-cv-02282-CAB, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, filed 10/31/2007.

5. B. Ivry, op. cit.; Jimmy Higgins, “Judge Boyko’s Snowball Starts Rolling Downhill,” Fire on the Mountain (blogspot) (February 26, 2008); Wendy Davis, “Finding It Hard to Be a Loan,” ABA Journal (March 2008).

6. “More Trouble for Mortgage Securitizers?”, http://bigpicture.typepad.com (December 9, 2007

7. Aaron Krowne, et al., “True Sale, False Securitizations,” iamfacingforeclosure.com (November)

Ellen Brown, J.D., developed her research skills as an attorney practicing civil litigation in Los Angeles. In Web of Debt, her latest book, she turns those skills to an analysis of the Federal Reserve and “the money trust.” She shows how this private cartel has usurped the power to create money from the people themselves and how we the people can get it back. Her websites are webofdebt.com and ellenbrown.com.

Ellen Brown is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Ellen Brown

The Agonist: Don’t Be Fooled by Wall Street’s Happy Talk

http://agonist.org/numerian/20080613/dont_be_fooled_by_wall_streets_happy_talk

The next phase of the financial and economic crisis is creeping up on us. You can see the signs in the U.S. stock market, where all the major indexes have reversed a three month rally and are now declining back to their March lows. This decline is led by the Dow and is in fact accelerating, taking with it last month’s cheerful prognostications that the U.S. not only has escaped a recession, but is bouncing back into full growth mode for the second half of this year.

The economic data do not confirm this picture at all. The employment situation continues to worsen, industrial production and factory utilization are lodged firmly in recessionary territory, and the only retail stores showing any sign of life are the deep discounters like Wal-Mart, benefiting temporarily from the tax rebates. Wall Street executives are telling us that the credit crisis is halfway over, but their behavior suggests otherwise. Lehman Brothers, for example, assured us last week that it was well-capitalized and fully in control of its future, but a few days later it announced a $2.8 billion loss and was forced to turn to the stock market and private investors to raise $6 billion more in capital. Where have we heard this story before?

Wall Street continues to underestimate the spreading default carnage that is going to bring down a few more financial powerhouses before this crisis is over. The big story emerging in the housing markets is the galloping number of foreclosures affecting “decent ordinary folks” with prime mortgages (as opposed to the sub-prime customer species that kicked off the housing market crisis). Defaults and foreclosures on alt-A and prime mortgages are jumping to record levels. It seems that quite a lot of these customers, just like their sub-prime brethren, never really had much equity in their houses in the first place, and now that housing prices are declining across the nation, nearly 20% of them are in a negative equity position. If you can’t afford the mortgage in the first place, why continue to make payments on a property that is continuing to lose value?

These people are not typically walking away from their mortgages, as the “jingle mail” stories suggest. They would like to stay in their homes, but they can no longer make the payments. In many cases, the financial entity that they need to talk to in order to obtain some relief is a “mortgage servicer” who doesn’t own the mortgage, and can’t possibly get agreement from all the hundreds of investors worldwide who own a tiny sliver of the mortgage that was long since sold off in a security. Congress can pass all the legislation it wants to provide relief from foreclosure for these homeowners, but it will be mostly fruitless. The securitization of mortgages in the past eight years has legally and practically destroyed the ability for the financial industry to come through with any accommodations, so the homeowner is ejected and the banks wind up owning the property.

The banks now own so many homes through foreclosure that cities across the U.S. are suing them to force them to keep the properties in decent shape. It most places it costs thousands of dollars to get the lawn mowed and trash picked up, and there are many circumstances where the home has been vandalized, costing the banks much more. The banks are learning a terrible lesson last experienced in the Depression – foreclosure is something to be avoided at all costs. It doesn’t just destroy the profit a bank may have had in the mortgage – it can destroy the bank. We are now seeing banks dump whole subdivisions onto the real estate market at 20% of the value at the market peak in 2006.

The bond market has learned that the mortgage crisis is just the beginning of the problems that banks are facing. Stage two is underway with deterioration in corporate debt, starting with the bonds issued by real estate developers, but spreading now to the high yield securities and bank loans of poorly capitalized and over-leveraged corporations. Well over 50% of all the corporate debt issued in the past eight years has been rated as junk debt, meaning it is not even investment grade (Baa rated or higher) and it has a very high probability of default. These probabilities are now working against the holders of these bonds, and the banks that have lent to these companies.

In normal circumstances the economy can work through these excesses, as consumers and corporations reduce their leverage and banks absorb the losses on bad debts. But these aren’t normal circumstances. The U.S. is no longer entirely in control of its economic destiny, and it isn’t even the engine that drives the global economy. China and India have created their own self-reinforcing economic dynamic, in which exports finance a growing demand for raw materials, starting with oil. As the price of petroleum has now crossed $130/bbl., an intolerable burden is being placed on a U.S. economy sinking in recession.

Consumers are increasingly turning to public transport – if it is available – to avoid paying over $4/gal. for gasoline. Part of the pricing pressure on the suburban McMansions built in the past five years comes from the cost of commuting to these homes built 50 miles or more from any jobs. Independent truck drivers are going out of business because the cost of diesel fuel over $5/gal. has shredded what were already dangerously thin profit margins. Their trucks are piling up on dealer’s lots, and used car dealers are now hesitant to accept any more SUVs. General Motors is thinking of canceling altogether its Hummer model, a war-chic road hog that at its best gets only 11 miles to the gallon.

The high price of oil is now clearly affecting all facets of the global economy, with one exception: wages. Workers are not being given pay increases, but instead are being pressed to put in longer hours, which is always management’s way of coping at first with an economic downturn. But usually around six months into a recession, companies cave in to reality and start letting people go. We’ve just passed the six month mark for this downturn, so expect the unemployment data to noticeably deteriorate; last month the unemployment rate jumped up ½% of a percentage point alone.

Just about the last people in America to recognize that we have an inflation problem are the esteemed governors of the Federal Reserve, who preferred to concentrate on the fictitious construct of “core inflation”, which eliminates from the calculation energy and food costs. But even Fed chairman Ben Bernanke is now beginning to face up to everyday reality, and has announced this month that Fed policy is now focused on combating inflation and fighting any further depreciation of the dollar on the foreign exchange markets. The days of interest rate declines are over, and the market is now estimating there is more than a 75% chance that the Fed will raise interest rates at their next Open Market committee meeting.

That’s just what the economy needs: higher interest rates on top of raging energy and food inflation, at the same time the entire housing sector is deflating. Obviously the Fed wouldn’t be piling on to our economic woes if it had a choice. The fact that it has no choice, and that it is trapped in the policy dilemma it now faces, is in good part its own fault. It’s not enough to blame China and India for oil price increases. There is still a lot of loose cash around the world that is being pumped into oil futures, which has helped as well to push prices to record levels. Most of this loose cash has been generated by the United States. We continue to flood the world with Treasury securities to finance both our domestic federal budget deficit, and our current account deficit, which combined exceed $1.5 trillion per year. On top of this, Bernanke’s dramatic interest rate cuts in the past six months have added yet more “liquidity” to the market. The banks aren’t using these funds to make loans, and investors aren’t eager to plow the money into the stock market given the inevitable decline ahead in corporate profits. That leaves the last great bubble as the only investment alternative: the commodities market, and specifically energy.

You’ve read no doubt about the nasty speculators who are involved in the commodities bubble. While there are certainly hundreds of hedge funds engaged in this speculative exercise, most of the money is coming from staid mutual funds, pension plans, university endowments, and other respectable entities desperate to find some investment vehicle that returns anything even matching the rate of inflation. Senator Joe Lieberman already has a bill submitted to restrict speculators from investing in commodity funds, but we’ll see how far this measure gets when Yale University’s endowment management have a quiet word with him about just who is going to get hurt if the bill is passed.

What can we expect in stage two? Expect first of all for the credit crisis to return with a vengeance. The omens are already lining up. Remember when Congress was all excited a few months ago about turning loose the Federal Housing Administration, and allowing them to jump-start the mortgage market with low-cost loans and down payment guarantees? It turns out the FHA isn’t interested in these broad new powers. It has enough problems of its own with its existing portfolio, which took a $4.6 billion write-down this past quarter due to rising foreclosures. That ate up over 25% of the FHA’s equity, and the commissioner had to reassure the market that the FHA itself isn’t facing bankruptcy – it just may need to turn to the Congress for an “appropriation.”

Right behind the FHA will be Freddie Mac, the Home Loan Banks, and the behemoth of them all, Fannie Mae. All of these federally chartered agencies are under stress from the worsening housing crisis, and all of them operate on thin amounts of capital. Congress thinks at the moment it has the luxury of opening up the taps of federal largesse in order to do something about the housing crisis, but the reality is that the agencies set up to help at a time like this will all have their hands out looking for taxpayer money just so they can survive.

The second thing you should watch for is the coming wave of corporate and municipal bankruptcies. Too many corporations are poorly capitalized and completely unprepared to meet their liabilities in a weak economy. Too many state and local governments are seeing tax revenues plummet, just at a time when decades of promises on employee pensions and medical plans are coming due. Something will have to give here, and ultimately the weakest players will seek protection from the bankruptcy courts.

That will leave hundreds of thousands of retired government workers facing an abrupt shift in their fortune, and equally large numbers of currently employed workers suddenly facing unemployment. That’s the third thing you should watch for: large-scale layoffs in the public and private sector, with significant second order economic effects on consumer spending. This is all part of the vicious cycle common with recessions – stressed out employers let staff go, leading to declines in consumer spending, leading to yet more pressure on corporations and government to fire even more workers. The difference now is that the viciousness of this cycle will far outweigh whatever pain was experienced in the last oil recession of 1974. This recession will be lucky to avoid being labeled as a depression when it is over.

Fourth, this recession is spreading globally. Housing markets in the U.K., Spain, Australia and Ireland are all reversing direction and following the U.S. into an implosion of foreclosures. Energy costs are rising everywhere, driving up as well the cost of basic food and things like livestock feed and fertilizer. This has led to riots in many emerging markets where fundamentals such as wheat and rice are hard to come by. Even the oil producing countries in the Gulf States are not immune to food scarcities. Central banks everywhere are talking tough about battling inflation, and a few are raising interest rates. Many of them are also raising margin requirements in the commodities markets to prevent speculation, and there is widespread condemnation of profiteers.

This is a very nasty situation for the central banks, forced to choose between accepting inflation that is accelerating well beyond target ranges, or raising interest rates and throwing the global economy into a much worse recession. As part of this conundrum, there is serious doubt about the value of repeating the Fed’s rescue for a financial firm like Bear Stearns, but if another such disaster crops up, letting yet another large bank or broker fail could lead to a systemic crisis of unimaginable magnitude. At some point though, governments including their central banks have to do something about the plight of the average citizen rather than continue to coddle millionaire bankers. To do otherwise is to risk social disorder.

These dreadful policy choices are only now beginning to play out in the U.S. electoral campaign, which is also beginning to focus on the domestic burden of continuing to fund the Iraq war. The American public has already turned against this war because of the high price that is being paid in death and injury, but the interplay between the war and America’s economic woes is beginning to become apparent. You can expect the Democrats to emphasize this linkage, and to ask Americans how fair it is that they are spending $12 billion a month to build Iraq, a country rich in oil, when at home people are losing their jobs, their pensions, their medical insurance, and in many cases their homes and the ability to feed their family. It will be the first time that the electorate will have to confront the economic costs of maintaining the vast American empire.

There is a point of inflection in any economic crisis where it becomes apparent to everyone that something has gone dramatically wrong and painful course corrections are needed. It often takes a major bankruptcy, or a sharp rise in unemployment, or a stock market crash, to awaken the public to the realities they have ignored or that have been hidden from them. The U.S. could experience any or all of these calamities, and at any time now. Heaven help the Republicans if this should occur prior to the first Tuesday in November.

Barry Ritholtz: Washington Post Blames HUD for Housing/Credit Crisis

Source: The Big Picture.

In a story this morning, the Washington Post picks up a meme circulating amongst conservative thinkers, and gives it front page treatment:

“In 2004, as regulators warned that subprime lenders were saddling borrowers with mortgages they could not afford, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development helped fuel more of that risky lending.

Eager to put more low-income and minority families into their own homes, the agency required that two government-chartered mortgage finance firms purchase far more “affordable” loans made to these borrowers. HUD stuck with an outdated policy that allowed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to count billions of dollars they invested in subprime loans as a public good that would foster affordable housing.

Housing experts and some congressional leaders now view those decisions as mistakes that contributed to an escalation of subprime lending that is roiling the U.S. economy.

How much did it contribute? What percentage of total mortgage lending was related to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development policies?

The article notes that a “very high concentration of these loans [are] in low-income and African American neighborhoods” — how does this relate to the massive waves of foreclosures in Florida, Southern California and Las Vegas ?

Read the rest of this great article here.

Phil Gramm and the Foreclosure Crisis

Source: David Corn, Mother Jones.

©Unknown

Years before Phil Gramm was a McCain campaign adviser and a lobbyist for a Swiss bank at the center of the housing credit crisis, he pulled a sly maneuver in the Senate that helped create today’s subprime meltdown.

Who’s to blame for the biggest financial catastrophe of our time? There are plenty of culprits, but one candidate for lead perp is former Sen. Phil Gramm. Eight years ago, as part of a decades-long anti-regulatory crusade, Gramm pulled a sly legislative maneuver that greased the way to the multibillion-dollar subprime meltdown. Yet has Gramm been banished from the corridors of power? Reviled as the villain who bankrupted Middle America? Hardly. Now a well-paid executive at a Swiss bank, Gramm cochairs Sen. John McCain’s presidential campaign and advises the Republican candidate on economic matters. He’s been mentioned as a possible Treasury secretary should McCain win. That’s right: A guy who helped screw up the global financial system could end up in charge of US economic policy. Talk about a market failure.

Gramm’s long been a handmaiden to Big Finance. In the 1990s, as chairman of the Senate banking committee, he routinely turned down Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Levitt’s requests for more money to police Wall Street; during this period, the sec’s workload shot up 80 percent, but its staff grew only 20 percent. Gramm also opposed an sec rule that would have prohibited accounting firms from getting too close to the companies they audited – at one point, according to Levitt’s memoir, he warned the sec chairman that if the commission adopted the rule, its funding would be cut. And in 1999, Gramm pushed through a historic banking deregulation bill that decimated Depression-era firewalls between commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and securities firms – setting off a wave of merger mania.

But Gramm’s most cunning coup on behalf of his friends in the financial services industry – friends who gave him millions over his 24-year congressional career – came on December 15, 2000. It was an especially tense time in Washington. Only two days earlier, the Supreme Court had issued its decision on Bush v. Gore. President Bill Clinton and the Republican-controlled Congress were locked in a budget showdown. It was the perfect moment for a wily senator to game the system. As Congress and the White House were hurriedly hammering out a $384-billion omnibus spending bill, Gramm slipped in a 262-page measure called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. Written with the help of financial industry lobbyists and cosponsored by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the chairman of the agriculture committee, the measure had been considered dead – even by Gramm. Few lawmakers had either the opportunity or inclination to read the version of the bill Gramm inserted. “Nobody in either chamber had any knowledge of what was going on or what was in it,” says a congressional aide familiar with the bill’s history.

It’s not exactly like Gramm hid his handiwork – far from it. The balding and bespectacled Texan strode onto the Senate floor to hail the act’s inclusion into the must-pass budget package. But only an expert, or a lobbyist, could have followed what Gramm was saying. The act, he declared, would ensure that neither the sec nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (cftc) got into the business of regulating newfangled financial products called swaps – and would thus “protect financial institutions from overregulation” and “position our financial services industries to be world leaders into the new century.”

It didn’t quite work out that way. For starters, the legislation contained a provision – lobbied for by Enron, a generous contributor to Gramm – that exempted energy trading from regulatory oversight, allowing Enron to run rampant, wreck the California electricity market, and cost consumers billions before it collapsed. (For Gramm, Enron was a family affair. Eight years earlier, his wife, Wendy Gramm, as cftc chairwoman, had pushed through a rule excluding Enron’s energy futures contracts from government oversight. Wendy later joined the Houston-based company’s board, and in the following years her Enron salary and stock income brought between $915,000 and $1.8 million into the Gramm household.)

But the Enron loophole was small potatoes compared to the devastation that unregulated swaps would unleash. Credit default swaps are essentially insurance policies covering the losses on securities in the event of a default. Financial institutions buy them to protect themselves if an investment they hold goes south. It’s like bookies trading bets, with banks and hedge funds gambling on whether an investment (say, a pile of subprime mortgages bundled into a security) will succeed or fail. Because of the swap-related provisions of Gramm’s bill – which were supported by Fed chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury secretary Larry Summers – a $62 trillion market (nearly four times the size of the entire US stock market) remained utterly unregulated, meaning no one made sure the banks and hedge funds had the assets to cover the losses they guaranteed.

In essence, Wall Street’s biggest players (which, thanks to Gramm’s earlier banking deregulation efforts, now incorporated everything from your checking account to your pension fund) ran a secret casino. “Tens of trillions of dollars of transactions were done in the dark,” says University of San Diego law professor Frank Partnoy, an expert on financial markets and derivatives. “No one had a picture of where the risks were flowing.” Betting on the risk of any given transaction became more important – and more lucrative – than the transactions themselves, Partnoy notes: “So there was more betting on the riskiest subprime mortgages than there were actual mortgages.” Banks and hedge funds, notes Michael Greenberger, who directed the cftc’s division of trading and markets in the late 1990s, “were betting the subprimes would pay off and they would not need the capital to support their bets.”

These unregulated swaps have been at “the heart of the subprime meltdown,” says Greenberger. “I happen to think Gramm did not know what he was doing. I don’t think a member in Congress had read the 262-page bill or had thought of the cataclysm it would cause.” In 1998, Greenberger’s division at the cftc proposed applying regulations to the burgeoning derivatives market. But, he says, “all hell broke loose. The lobbyists for major commercial banks and investment banks and hedge funds went wild. They all wanted to be trading without the government looking over their shoulder.”

Now, belatedly, the feds are swooping in – but not to regulate the industry, only to bail it out, as they did in engineering the March takeover of investment banking giant Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, fearing the firm’s collapse could trigger a dominoes-like crash of the entire credit derivatives market.

No one in Washington apologizes for anything, so it’s no surprise that Gramm has failed to issue any mea culpa. Post-Enron, says Greenberger, the senator even called him to say, “You’re going around saying this was my fault – and it’s not my fault. I didn’t intend this.”

Whether or not Gramm had bothered to ponder the potential downsides of his commodities legislation, having helped set off an industry free-for-all, he reaped the rewards. In 2003, he left the Senate to take a highly lucrative job at ubs, Switzerland’s largest bank, which had been able to acquire investment house PaineWebber due to his banking deregulation bill. He would soon be lobbying Congress, the Fed, and the Treasury Department for ubs on banking and mortgage matters. There was a moment of poetic justice when ubs became one of the subprime crisis’ top losers, writing down $37 billion as of this spring – an amount equal to its previous four years of profits combined. In a report explaining how it had managed to mess up so grandly, ubs noted that two-thirds of its losses were the fault of collateralized debt obligations – securities backed largely by subprime instruments – and that credit default swaps had been “key to the growth” of its out-of-control cdo business. (Gramm declined to comment for this article.)

Gramm’s record as a reckless deregulator has not affected his rating as a Republican economic expert. Sen. John McCain has relied on him for policy advice, especially, according to the campaign, on housing matters. The two have been buddies ever since they served together in the House in the 1980s; in 1996, McCain chaired Gramm’s flop of a presidential campaign. (Gramm spent $21 million and earned only 10 delegates during the gop primaries.) In 2005, McCain told a Wall Street Journal columnist that Gramm was his economic guru. Two years later, Gramm wrote a piece for the Journal extolling McCain as a modern-day Abraham Lincoln, and he’s hailed McCain’s love of tax cuts and free trade. Media accounts have identified Gramm as a contender for the top slot at the Treasury Department if McCain reaches the White House. “If McCain gets in,” frets Lynn Turner, a former chief sec accountant, “we’ll have more of the same deregulatory mess. I like John McCain, but given what I know about Phil Gramm, I wouldn’t vote for McCain.”

As a thriving bank exec and presidential adviser, Gramm has defied a prime economic principle: Bad products are driven out of the market. In John McCain, he has gained an important customer, so his stock has gone up in value. And there’s no telling when the Gramm bubble will burst.

The Hyperinflationary Shell Game

By: Darryl R Schoon, The Market Oracle.

Modern economics is not rocket science. In fact, it’s not science at all. It’s a game, a confidence game. Once paper passed for money, economics became an elaborate shell game designed to hide the fact paper had been substituted for silver and gold. Debt ratings are an attempt to quantify confidence in paper assets and are an essential part of the game. The shell game is called “Where’s The Money?” The answer is simple, it’s not there.

The question “where did the money go during the Great Depression?” has now been answered to my satisfaction. During the Great Depression, money essentially disappeared and, as a consequence, consumer and business demand collapsed as did prices, beginning a downward coreolis-like spiral that was to suck the global economy into an economic black hole.

My study of the Great Depression began in the 1990s and the subsequent collapse of the dot.com bubble provided a real-time corroboration of assumptions about the connection between loose credit, excessive speculation, and financial bubbles; and, now, in 2008, one of my most troubling questions about the depression has been answered—where did the money go during the Great Depression?

Plunge In US Commercial Property , an article by Daniel Pimlott posted on FT.com (Financial Times) May 21, 2008 provided a critical clue:

Commercial property prices in the US in February saw their sharpest decline since records began nearly 15 years ago as sources of finance for deals has dried up, according to data from Standard & Poor’s out yesterday.

The value of commercial buildings fell 1.03 percent between January and February, the largest monthly decline since at least 1993, when the industry was just emerging from a deep slump.

The fall in national property prices comes as banks have retrenched on lending due to credit crisis and the slowing economy, causing the volume of deals to slow sharply. The market for commercial mortgage-backed securities, which until last August was a major route to cheaper borrowing, has largely ground to a halt.

Sales of commercial properties were down 71 per cent in the first quarter compared with a year earlier, according to data from Real Capital Analytics.

The fact that sales of US commercial real estate fell an astounding 71 % from 1 st quarter 2007 to 1 st quarter 2008 is shocking and the implications are quite serious. The cause of the slowdown, however, provided the very clue I was seeking.

Commercial property prices in the US … saw their sharpest decline…as sources of finance for deals has dried up … as banks have retrenched on lending due to credit crisis…

DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION MONEY DID NOT DISAPPEAR CREDIT DID

The answer to: Where did the money go in the Great Depression? is found in the metaphor of the shell game. It is now clear that money didn’t disappear during the Great Depression, credit disappeared.

The money was never there in the first place. Money had been replaced by credit in the shell game introduced by the Federal Reserve in 1913 when the Federal Reserve began issuing credit-based Federal Reserve notes in place of the savings-based money from the US Treasury.

For details on how the shell game is run, Professor Antal E. Fekete’s description of the check kiting scheme between the US Treasury and Federal Reserve provides crucial information for those perhaps wishing themselves to live off the earnings of others.

It is epitomized by an elaborate check-kiting conspiracy between the U.S: Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Treasury bonds, contrary to appearances, are no more redeemable than Federal Reserve notes. It’s all very neat: the notes are backed by the bonds, and the bonds are redeemable by the notes. Therefore each is valued in terms of itself, rather than by an independent outside asset. Each is an irredeemable liability of the U.S: government. The whole scheme boils down to a farce. It is check-kiting at the highest level. At maturity the bonds are replaced by another with a more distant maturity date, or they are ostensibly paid in the form of irredeemable currency. The issuer of either type of debt is usurping a privilege without accepting the countervailing duty. They issue obligations without taking any further responsibility for their fate or for the effect they have on the economy. Moreover, a double standard of justice is involved. Check-kiting is a crime under the Criminal Code. That is, provided that it is perpetrated by private individuals. Practiced at the highest level, check-kiting is the corner-stone of the monetary system.

GOTTERDÄMMERUNG The Twilight of Irredeemable Debt , Antal E. Fekete , April 28, 2008

http://www.professorfekete.com/articles%5CAEFGotterdammerung.pdf

THE STUDY OF MODERN ECONOMICS IS SIMILAR

TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN A TIME OF IDOLATRY

In the shell game of modern economics, credit replaces money and when credit gives rise to speculative bubbles, the collapse of those bubbles leads to the defaulting of debt which causes credit to disappear and the economy to collapse.

The credit based shell game, however, is nearing its end. The historic credit contraction that began in August 2007 is still in progress. Despite the efforts of central bankers, credit is still disappearing and, just as in the Great Depression, the credit contraction is continuing to spread causing more and more debt to default.

Credit, the fertilizer of human debt, when no longer available effectively spells the end of the legalized shell game masquerading as modern economics; but the kreditmeisters , their global confidence game now damaged by an unexpected lack of confidence on the part of the marks, sic investors, however, will not give up their scam easily.

THE CONUNDRUM OF THE KREDITMEISTERS

Those running the shell game, the central bankers and their codependent brethren, investment bankers, are terrified of losing their day jobs, They have lived well for three hundred years (since the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694) leveraging the productivity of others and we can be assured they will do everything in their considerable power to keep their lifestyle intact.

At this time the central bankers are collectively engaged in financial triage as they attempt to replace the credit that is rapidly being withdrawn in the face of ever increasing amounts of defaulting debt.

Following the same play book they used in the aftermath of the dot.com collapse, the Fed has quickly cut rates from 5.25 % to 2 % but this time they will not ignite a housing bubble as they did the last time. This time, they will do worse. This time, they will burn down the house.

BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE

In the long run, there is no short run

In retrospect it will all be clear, the mistakes, the reasons, the excuses, the results. Now, however, in the beginning of the collapse, events appear more problematic, the outcome still unknown. Nonetheless, even in the fog of unexpected events, certain things can be known and safely predicted; and, one of them is that we are now on the road to hyperinflation.

Appointing “Helicopter Ben” Bernanke to head the Federal Reserve now is akin to sending Sammy the Bull, the mafia hit-man, to negotiate with the Palestinians and Israelis; and when the news comes back that Sammy the Bull shot and killed the Palestinians and Israelis at the negotiating table, we should not be surprised—just as we should not be surprised that Ben “the printing press” Bernanke is erring on the side of excess in the current economic crisis by providing even more credit, by shoving even more debt based paper into now a burning house.

WHEN A HOUSE OF PAPER MONEY BURNS

Hyperinflation is to inflation like pneumonia is to a cold. Though similar, the former is much more consequential; and whereas pneumonia can sometimes kill, hyperinflation is a veritable death sentence. Hyperinflation always ends in the total destruction of paper money. In hyperinflation, the value of paper money reverts to its mean—ZERO.

The past is indeed prologue when it comes to humanity, printing presses, and the recurrent desire of governments to turn paper into gold; which through the alchemy of central banking is possible—though only for a limited time.

While central bankers and governments do not intend to cause hyperinflation anymore than drunk drivers intend to crash, they are nonetheless responsible for the decisions that lead to hyperinflation and deflationary depressions.

The United States has experienced high rates of inflation in the past and appears to be running the same type of fiscal policies that engendered hyperinflations in 20 countries over the past century.

Professor Laurance Kotlikoff, Federal Reserve Bank Review St Louis July/Aug 2006

The US is the largest economy in the world and the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency. Its central bank, the Federal Reserve, is the most influential, and Ben “the printing press” Bernanke is its chairman. We should not be surprised at what is now going to happen to the US , the US dollar and the world economy.

As the Fed is busy bailing out international investment banks with America’s money, we should be more concerned with what is going to happen to us; because when the US dollar goes up in smoke, the US economy will go down in flames and the world economy will stumble badly, if not collapse completely.

Hyperinflation will destroy both the US dollar and the US economy and the world will not be unaffected. Professor Kotlikoff’s warning about a US hyperinflation was published in 2006; and, now in 2008, US printing presses under Fed chairman Ben Bernanke are running faster than they’ve ever been run before.

HYPERINFLATION IS LIKE STEPPING OFF A CLIFF.

YOU ONLY EXPERIENCE IT AFTER YOU’VE GONE TOO FAR

Friedrich Kessler, a law professor at Harvard and at Boalt Hall UC Berkeley described the onset of hyperinflation during the Weimar Republic in Germany .

It was horrible. Horrible! Like lightening it struck. No one was prepared. You cannot imagine the rapidity with which the whole thing happened. The shelves in the grocery stores were empty. You could buy nothing with your paper money.

From Fiat Paper Money, The History And Evolution of Our Currency $28.50 by Ralph T. Foster, tfdf@pacbell.net (510) 845-3015 This book, a primer on the end game, is everything you wanted to know about fiat paper money and were too afraid to ask.

At Session III of Professor Fekete’s Gold Standard University Live in February, I discussed the possibility of a sequential or simultaneous hyperinflationary deflationary depression, the economic equivalent of having both a severe heart condition and a possibly fatal cancer at the same time. Such is not impossible; in fact, it is increasingly likely.

I highly recommend the thorough and studied analysis of hyperinflation and concurrent possibilities in John Williams’ Hyperinflation Special Report , Shadow Government Statistics, Series Issue No. 41, April 8, 2008 , http://www.shadowstats.com/article/292 . John Williams also references and recommends Ralph T. Foster’s Fiat Paper Money, The History And Evolution of Our Currency noted above.

The critical question should now be asked: What can we do?

THE PARACHUTE OF GOLD AND SILVER

JUMPING OUT OF UNCLE BEN’S SPUTTERING HELIPCOPTER

The following is from The Nightmare German Inflation , Scientific Market Analysis, 1970, which describes the extreme hyperinflationary conditions during the Weimar Republic in the 1920s:

The ones who fared best were the small minority who had the foresight to exchange marks into foreign money or gold very early, before new laws made this difficult and before the mark lost too much value.

The difference between 1920s Germany and today is that there are no longer any currencies convertible to precious metals. In the 1920s, when hyperinflation destroyed the German mark, other currencies were still tied to gold. Today, this is no longer the case. Today, only gold and silver will offer guaranteed monetary refuge during the coming crisis.

A hyperinflation is a monetary phenomena caused by the rapid printing of money not convertible to gold or silver. The inflation of the paper money supply happens gradually, but hyperinflation is itself a sudden-onset phenomena . Suddenly and unexpectedly, inflation becomes hyperinflation and unless you are already prepared, it is already too late.

Today, we are moving closer to the end game, the resolution of past monetary sins when the banker’s shell game is exposed for what it is—a monetary abomination, a parasite on the economic body that over time kills the host on which it feeds.

Be aware. Be careful. Be safe.

Have faith.

Note I: I now have a blog, Moving Through The Maelstom with Darryl Robert Schoon . My first blog discusses the underlying reasons for our increasing series of crises. see http://www.posdev.net/pdn/index.php?option=com_myblog&blogger=drs&Itemid=106

Note II: I will be speaking at Professor Antal E. Fekete’s Session IV of Gold Standard University Live (GSUL) July 3-6, 2008 in Szombathely , Hungary . If you are interested in monetary matters and gold, the opportunity to hear Professor Fekete should not be missed. A perusal of Professor Fekete’s topics may convince you to attend (see http://www.professorfekete.com/gsul.asp ). Professor Fekete, in my opinion, is a giant in a time of small men.

Darryl Robert Schoon
www.survivethecrisis.com
www.drschoon.com